In the subsequent stages of the argument, Socrates distinguishes the sense in which a person can be said to merely have a belief about something into which one might inquirefrom the sense in which he can be said to know the same thing 97ff.
Perhaps the notion of a particular is such a case. I perceive the one, you perceive the other. The Form, Beauty Itself, makes possible the fact that Helen is beautiful, in so far as a form-copy of Beauty is something she has.
Plato never considers the global skeptical challenge.
To avoid these absurdities it is necessary to posit the intelligible world the world of the Forms alongside the sensible world the world of perception.
But only Smith has knowledge of the road, whereas Jones has a true belief. If the equal things are different from Equality and yet can bring Equality into our minds, they must somehow remind us of the Form of Equality.
This theory enumerates two levels of reality. Particulars are deficient because they can or do change. On the other hand, suppose that Smith has actually driven numerous times from NYC to Chicago by getting on 80 and heading west. There is no space here to comment in detail on every one of these arguments, some of which, as noted above, have often been thought frivolous or comically intended cp.
Thus, it is possible not to know what we are looking for prior to learn it2. But if that is possible, then his argument contradicts itself: For, according to this model, knowledge is a matter of insight or internal vision. In one sense it is a new way of cashing out the idea that Forms and particulars are different kinds or types of entities.
These passages seem to imply that perhaps knowledge is some form of justified true belief. Suppose that a particular is F. Distinction 2 is also at work, apparently, in the discussion of some of the nine objections addressed to the Protagorean theory.
For book-length developments of this reading of the Theaetetus, see Sedley and Chappell On this reading, the strategy of the discussion of D1 is to move us towards the view that sensible phenomena have to fall under the same general metaphysical theory as intelligible phenomena.
The Meno, then, with its discussion of recollection, knowledge and belief sets the stage for the middle Platonic epistemology. There is the world of visible and sensible things, the object of what Plato called "doxa" opinion. The crucial issue is whether form-copies are dependent on particulars, especially whether their claim to be individual or unit-properties is only as good as the company they keep.
Moreover, since change implies that something comes to be what it was not—I change from not being tan to being tan, nothing can change.The knowledge of it is not true knowledge, nor the source, but only the occasion of true knowledge. The phenomena stimulate our minds to a recollection of the intuition of Ideas, and with that intuition scientific knowledge begins.
C. was misled by Stenzel (op. cit., particularly p.
), who saw clearly enough (pp. –6) the difficulties in the interpretation of Phdr. b, but was wrong, or at least misleading, in stating (p.
) that ‘the only “individual” (Individuum) recognised by him (Plato) is the “atomic Form”, the object of true opinion’. Plato believed that the same point could be made with regard to many other abstract concepts: even though we perceive only their imperfect instances, we have genuine knowledge of truth, goodness, and beauty no less than of equality.
- Plato's Theory of Human Knowledge Plato contended that all true knowledge is recollection. He stated that we all have innate knowledge that tells us about the things we experience in our world.
This knowledge, Plato believed, was gained when the soul resided in the invisible realm, the realm of The Forms and The Good. That is, since learning is a dynamic process whose termini are roughly our first thoughts and talk about the world, on the one hand, and knowledge of Forms on the other, and since in thinking and talking about the world we must apply concepts, recollection is viewed as a doctrine of innate ideas whose effects are felt almost immediately in the conscious mind.
The Theory of Recollection is laid out in more detail in Plato's Meno, and the discussion in the Phaedo alludes to, and seems to assume prior knowledge of, this earlier discussion.
The Phaedo and the Meno are consistent, though, and the presentation of the theory in each dialogue can stand on its own.Download